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Are They Different? CEOs Made in CEO Factories 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the employment histories of CEOs at large US companies and find that a 
disproportionately large number of CEOs are originated from a small number of high-profile 
firms that are praised for their superior abilities in training and developing corporate leaders, 
referred to as CEO factories. Specifically, 20.5% of all CEOs appointed at the S&P 1500 firms 
from 1992 to 2010 came from 36 CEO factories. CEOs originated from those CEO factories are 
referred to as factory CEOs. Appointments of factory CEOs are associated with significantly 
larger announcement returns than the appointments of CEOs without work experiences at a 
factory firm. The abnormal announcement returns are larger for CEOs who had a longer tenure at 
a CEO factory and for CEOs who joined the new firm shortly after their departure from a CEO 
factory, suggesting that CEOs accumulated valuable human capital while working at the CEO 
factory. We further show that factory CEOs tend to adopt investment and financing policies 
similar to those they had implemented or witnessed at the CEO factory. The choice of a factory 
CEO appears to be a decision made by the board of directors, taking into account the portfolio of 
the CEO’s managerial skills and the imprints of the CEO factory. In the long run, firms hiring 
factory CEOs exhibit better operating performance and award those CEOs with greater 
compensation. 
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1. Introduction 
Labor economists have long assumed that managerial talents affect firm performance.1  
Only recently, research in economics and finance has started to link managerial styles to 
corporate decisions and firm performance.2 Innate traits of CEOs such as overconfidence and 
risk aversion are shown to be associated with firm investment and financing decisions. 3 
Professional experiences such as financial difficulties are also shown to affect managerial 
decisions.4 This paper examines how human capital accumulated at companies that are praised 
for nurturing corporate leaders affects the nature and quality of managerial decisions, and 
whether prior work experiences in such high-profile companies make better CEOs that create 
greater values for shareholders. 
Anecdotal accounts on CEO appointments recognize that a small number of firms have 
produced a disproportionately large number of CEOs in the US. For example, General Electric 
(GE), often praised for its impressive ability of nurturing and developing managerial human 
capital, provided 49 CEOs and many more top executives for the S&P 1500 firms during the 
period of 1992 to 2010. We refer to these firms (e.g., GE, IBM, and P&G) as CEO Factories and 
find that over 20% of the CEOs appointed at the S&P 1500 firms come from 36 firms identified 
as CEO factories (Table 1). Despite the widespread evidence on the role of CEO factories in 
providing corporate leaders to the economy, there is no systematic examination on the 
effectiveness of corporate decisions made by CEOs coming from those leadership training 
grounds (referred to as Factory CEOs). Do factory CEOs outperform their peers? Do they have 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Rosen (1981); Murphy and Zabojnik (2004); Gabaix and Landier (2008). 
2 See, for example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2012). 
3 See, for example, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008); Graham, Harvey and Puri (2012); Malmendier, Tate and 
Yan (2011); Cronqvist , Makhija and Yonker (2012). 
4 For example, managers having experienced financial difficulties during their earlier professional careers tend to be 
more conservative in investment and financing policies; see Schoar and Zuo (2013); Dittmar and Dunchin (2013). 
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different management styles? Are those management styles transferrable when executives switch 
employers? This paper is designed to answer these questions.5  
Managerial skills consist of general managerial skills, and industry- and firm-specific 
human capital (Murphy and Zabojnik 2004; Cremers and Grinstein 2013). General managerial 
skills such as strategic visions, abilities to motivate employees, and perseverance in achieving 
goals can be developed at CEO factories, and are likely portable across firms. Industry and firm 
specific human capital such as relationship with suppliers and customers, and technical and 
regulatory knowledge unique to the industry are less transferrable when an executive switches 
employers. Both types of skills are critical for a CEO’s success. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) 
and Custodia, Ferreira and Matos (2012) present evidence on the increased importance of general 
managerial skills over firm-specific human capital in the market for CEOs in recent years.  
Strong general managerial skills that factory CEOs acquired at leadership training 
grounds are likely to be applicable to their new environments. It is more interesting to know 
whether factory CEOs tend to gear corporate policies towards what they had implemented or 
witnessed at those successful CEO factories. For example, a CEO who had been involved in 
successful acquisitions at a factory firm is more comfortable about engaging in acquisitions to 
expand his new firm. Does the board of directors take into account such imprints of CEO 
factories in management styles when hiring a new CEO? Our empirical evidence suggests that, 
                                                 
5 Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) examine policy changes around exogenous leadership transitions and find no 
evidence on idiosyncratic managerial styles; that is, variability and policy changes do not increase with the supply of 
managerial talent. With forced CEO turnovers, in contrast, they find significant changes in firm policies and claim 
that their evidence is consistent with causal relationship between managerial style and firm policies and with the 
board’s anticipation of these effects in their choice of replacement managers. 
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on average, firms appear to have selected factory CEOs with the right skills sets and thus got 
rewarded in the capital market.6   
Out of 2,365 new CEO appointments at the current and past S&P 1500 firms during the 
period of 1992–2010, we identify 484 CEOs who had worked at one or more CEO factories, 
referred to as factory CEOs. The remaining 1,881 CEOs are referred to as non-factory CEOs. 
While a typical CEO factory supplies 14.3 CEOs to the economy, the average number of CEOs 
originating from non-CEO factories is only 1.6.  
To understand whether factory CEOs systematically differ from non-factory CEOs in the 
quality of human capital, we first analyze the announcement returns for CEO appointments. We 
compare the abnormal returns in the three-day window around the announcement of appointing 
factory CEOs with those of appointing non-factory CEOs. The mean difference in the abnormal 
announcement return between factory and non-factory CEO appointments is 0.951%. Given that 
the average of the abnormal announcement returns for new CEO appointments is 0.593%, it 
appears that the market appreciates the management styles and human capital brought by CEOs 
from the CEO factory. On average, a firm appointing a factory CEO experiences an increase of 
$167 million in its market capitalization over three days around the announcement date, while 
the increase for a firm appointing a non-factory CEO is only $20 million.7  
Interestingly, when we classify new CEOs based on whether they were key executives 
(CEO, president, and Chief Operating Officer – COO) at the employer immediately before 
assuming the CEO post, the difference in the announcement return between appointing a factory 
                                                 
6 Examining the roles of directors in shaping corporate policies, Bouwman and Xuan (2012) show that a firm is 
more likely to adopt a policy (equity issuance, dividend policy, mergers and acquisitions, earnings management) if 
other firms at which its directors have board seats have adopted that policy. They conclude that director overlap is a 
potentially important channel for propagating key corporate policies across firms.  
7 Results are very similar when we compare abnormal announcement returns using a five-day window.  
 
6 
 
CEO and a non-factory CEO mainly comes from those CEOs who were key executives. In other 
words, relative to non-factory CEOs, those factory CEOs who had shouldered greater 
responsibilities, often at CEO factories, are expected to have greater impacts at the new firm and 
create more values for shareholders. Their experiences at the CEO factory are greatly appreciated 
because they have proven abilities and/or track records in shaping firm strategies and 
implementing corporate policies.  
There are various reasons why executives who have worked at CEO factories may 
become successful CEOs. First, some executives are born with innate traits of great leaders such 
as visions, abilities to motivate people, and resoluteness in achieving goals. CEO factories are 
good at identifying these future corporate leaders. Second, CEO factories may be good at 
developing CEO human capital by giving executives greater responsibilities early on and by 
putting executives into stretch assignments in various environments, both domestic and abroad. 
Executives may also acquire valuable connections and networks with other future corporate 
leaders through leadership training programs at those CEO factories. Surely, CEO factories may 
be good at both identifying and developing managerial talents. 
To differentiate these possibilities, we conduct two tests. First, we look at the abnormal 
announcement returns based on the time span an executive had worked at a CEO factory before 
assuming the CEO post. If CEO factories are merely good at identifying future leaders, we do 
not expect to find a difference in abnormal announcement returns between factory CEOs with 
longer tenures and those with shorter tenures at the CEO factory. Not surprisingly, we find that 
CEOs who had worked longer at a CEO factory are associated with a significantly higher 
announcement return, suggesting that executives have acquired managerial skills at CEO 
factories.  
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Furthermore, we look the time interval between an executive’s departure from a CEO 
factory and the time when he assumes the CEO post. If CEO factories merely select mangers 
with great innate leadership traits, we expect to find no difference in abnormal announcement 
returns between factory CEOs who assume the CEO post shortly after departing from the CEO 
factory and those who left the CEO factory a while ago, because those innate traits are not 
supposed to change over time. In contrast, memories of trainings, experiences acquired and 
connections obtained at a CEO factory may diminish over time. As a result, an executive’s 
human capital may deteriorate over time after leaving a factory firm. We find that an executive 
who became a CEO shortly after leaving a CEO factory is associated with a significantly greater 
abnormal return around the announcement, suggesting that executives have acquired managerial 
skills for becoming a successful CEO at CEO factories.  
The positive relation between the appointment of factory CEOs and announcement 
returns continues to hold in a multivariate framework after controlling for firm characteristics 
and CEO characteristics such as gender, age and education. Economically, hiring a factory CEO 
is associated with a 0.746 percentage point increase in the three-day abnormal returns around the 
announcement date.  
 If the market believes that factory CEOs have greater abilities to create values, the 
observed higher announcement returns around the appointment of a factory CEO should be 
followed by better operating performance at firms hiring a factory CEO. We find that those firms 
exhibit better operating performance measured by return on assets (ROA) in the three years 
following the appointment of the CEO, relative to firms hiring a non-factory CEO. In terms of 
economic magnitude, hiring a factory CEO is associated with an increase of 0.9 percentage point 
in the operating performance in the first three years. If the human capital developed at CEO 
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factories is more valuable for shareholders, factory CEOs should be rewarded accordingly. We 
show that factory CEOs do receive greater compensation at the new firm after controlling for a 
list of economic determinants of CEO compensation. 
Overall, our results highlight the existence of firms which are efficient in developing 
leadership skills and CEO specific human capital. Given that CEO factories are, on average, 
diversified firms with 7.4 segments, our paper speaks to one of the bright side of corporate 
diversification elaborated in Tate ad Lin (2012). This paper provides evidence that employees in 
diversified firms have greater cross-industry mobility and they are more productive than 
executives of focused firms of the same size, age and industry. Consistent with this evidence, our 
paper suggests that one channel CEO factories are able to nurture CEO specific human capital is 
that they are able to expose their executive talent to a broad variety of industries and help them 
develop skills that can be transferred to different business environments. 
Our results are also related to those in Custodia, Ferreira and Matos (2012) which present 
evidence on the importance of general managerial skills over firm-specific human capital in the 
market for CEOs. It is possible that CEO factories allow their employees to develop general 
managerial skills by providing them with an opportunity to work in different industries across 
different functions. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that factory CEOs in our sample 
have an average general managerial ability index of 0.68, significantly higher than the average 
general managerial ability index of -0.10 for non-factory CEOs.8 
Another, not mutually exclusive, possibility is that managers gain confidence in certain 
corporate policies after successfully implementing or witnessing their successful implementation 
at the factory firm. Thus, they are more likely to implement such “familiar” policies at the new 
firm. Different factory firms have their unique styles. The board of directors takes into account 
                                                 
8 We thank Claudia Custodio, Miguel Ferreira, and Pedro Matos for generously sharing their data with us. 
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such ingrained management styles and purposely select a manager with certain experiences that 
fit the firm’s new strategic direction. These CEOs would likely to gear corporate decisions 
towards ones of their prior factory firms everything else equal. Our empirical evidence suggests 
that this is true on average when a firm hires a CEO with factory experience. We find that a 
convergence in both investment and financing policies between the firm hiring a factory CEO 
and the CEO’s factory firm. Stronger operating performance and the capital market’s positive 
reaction to the appointment of a factory CEO are both supportive of the effectiveness of such 
matching processes. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and sample construction. 
Section 3 examines whether factory CEOs are better performers. Section 4 explores the 
underlying reasons of the better performance of factory CEOs. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data and Sample Description  
 We begin constructing our sample of companies and CEOs from the Compustat 
ExecuComp database between 1992 and 2010. ExecuComp provides time series compensation 
data for top executives in the S&P 1500 firms starting from year 1992. We identify CEOs at the 
firm-year level based on the CEO annual flag, the job title, and the year of becoming CEO 
provided in ExecuComp. For each firm-year, we compare the CEO with the CEO in the previous 
year, and examine whether there is a CEO turnover in that particular year.  
 For each of the CEO turnover events, we use the BoardEx database to collect data on the 
incoming CEO’s biographic information. BoardEx provides a comprehensive coverage of senior 
executives and board members of U.S. public companies, such as personal characteristics (e.g., 
birth year, gender), educational background (e.g., the school where he earned his undergraduate 
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degree, or any high-level degree such as MBA), as well as professional working experience (e.g., 
companies that he worked for, and the roles in those firms).  
We next search in Factiva for the exact announcement date for each new CEO 
appointment. Although ExecuComp provides a date of becoming the CEO, this is usually the 
date that the new CEO officially takes the office, and it may be very different from the date when 
the market first learns about the CEO appointment. We exclude CEOs with missing previous 
employment history. One final sample contains 2,365 CEO appointments (turnovers) over the 
period of 1992–2010.  
 For each of our sample CEOs, we trace their employment history prior to becoming the 
CEO from the BoardEx database. Table 1 presents the top 30 companies (we have 36 companies 
because of ties) that produced the largest number of CEOs in our sample, and we refer to these 
firms as CEO factories. We define a CEO as a factory CEO if he has worked at any of these 
CEO factories prior to becoming a CEO. The remaining CEOs are classified as non-factory 
CEOs. Among the 2,365 CEO appointments in our sample, 484 are factory CEOs, and 1,881 are 
non-factory CEOs.9  
We report the year distribution of CEO appointments of our sample in Panel A, and the 
industry distribution based on the Fama-French 12 industry classifications (Fama and French 
1997) in Panel B of Table 2. There are some variations across years and industries. Our analysis 
later will include both year fixed effects and industry fixed effects to control for industry patterns 
and time trends.  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for various characteristics of the hiring firms and 
incoming CEOs. Variable constructions are described in more detail in the Appendix. In our 
                                                 
9 Our definition of CEO factories is based on the coverage of all CEOs during our sample period of 1992 to 2010. 
We also tried alternative rolling windows; the list of CEO factories has been quite stable over time. 
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sample, 20.5% of new CEOs have factory experiences. On average, factory CEOs have worked 
at a factory firm for 13 years and assume the CEO post 7.5 years after their departures. 
Comparing with non-factory CEOs, we find that factory CEOs tend to join larger firms with 
higher market-to-book ratio, higher leverage, and poorer stock performance. In addition, factory 
CEOs are more likely to be hired externally, 10 less likely to hold key executive positions (CEO, 
President, and COO) at the previous employer, less likely to be male, and more likely to have an 
MBA degree and graduate from an elite school.11 
3. Are Factory CEOs Better Performers? 
 Firms identified as CEO factories have consistently provided a large number of CEOs 
over the years. It is natural to ask if CEOs originated from these factory firms are better 
performers at their new firms. To answer this question, we first analyze the announcement 
returns of CEO appointments; and then the long-run operating performance of the hiring firm 
subsequent to the CEO turnover.  
3.1. Announcement Returns around CEO Appointments 
3.1.1. Univariate Comparisons 
To measure announcement returns from the appointment of CEOs, we obtain cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) using the standard event study methodology developed by Brown and 
Warner (1985). More specifically, we use the CRSP value-weighted return as the market return 
and estimate the market model parameters over the 200 trading days ending one month before 
the CEO appointment date.  
                                                 
10 Some CEOs were hired first in a transitional role (e.g., COO) before becoming the CEO. We define external hires 
as the ones who have worked at the focal firm for less than 12 months before getting appointed to the CEO position.  
11 We define elite schools as the eight Ivy League universities plus Stanford and MIT. Our results do not change if 
we only consider the eight Ivy League schools, or if we consider the top thirty schools which produce the most 
number of CEOs.  
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Table 4 reports CARs over the three-day window [-1, +1] and over the five-day window 
[-2, +2], where the event day 0 is the CEO appointment date. The first two columns of Panel A 
display the mean and median CARs for the full sample. We find that the mean (median) three-
day abnormal return is 0.593% (0.208%) and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
The sign and the magnitude of full sample CARs are consistent with prior research (e.g., Adams 
and Mansi 2009), and suggest that on average CEO turnover events are value-enhancing to 
shareholders.  
We next split the full sample into two groups based on whether the CEO comes from a 
CEO factory or not, and present the subsample CAR results. We find that factory CEOs are 
associated with significantly higher CARs, compared to non-factory CEOs. The mean and 
median difference in three-day CARs between factory and non-factory CEOs are 0.951% and 
0.334% respectively, significantly different from zero at the 1% and the 5% level. The difference 
is large compared to the full sample mean CAR of 0.593%. In terms of dollar values, an average 
firm appointing a factory CEO experiences an increase of $167 million in its market 
capitalization during the three-day window around the announcement, compared to an increase 
of merely $20 million for an average firm appointing a non-factory CEO. These magnitudes 
suggest that the market appreciates the values of factory CEOs and reacts positively to their 
appointments.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we look at external CEO and internal CEO subsamples. Among 
our sample of 2,365 CEO appointments, 959 are hired from outside, and the remaining 1,406 
CEOs are promoted internally. Among the external CEOs, 263 are factory CEOs and 696 are 
non-factory CEOs. Among the internal CEOs, 221 have factory experience and the rest 1,185 do 
not. Consistent with the previous literature, the announcement returns are significantly higher in 
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external hires than in internal promotions, regardless of whether this CEO is a factory CEO or 
not. Interestingly, we find that the difference in CARs between factory and non-factory CEOs 
comes mainly from externally hired CEOs. The three-day mean CAR for externally hired factory 
CEOs is 2.281%, significantly higher than the 0.997% CAR for externally hired non-factory 
CEOs at the 1% level. 
CEO’s position at the previous job prior to becoming the CEO could also affect the 
announcement returns of CEO appointment. In Table 4 Panel C, we examine two subsamples 
based on whether the CEO has served at some key executive positions prior to becoming the 
CEO of the focal firm. Among 2,365 new CEOs in our sample, 1,289 CEOs held key executive 
positions in his last job, and the remaining 1,076 CEOs do not. Among the key executives, 247 
are factory CEOs and 1,042 are non-factory CEOs. Among the non-key executives, 237 have 
factory experience and the remaining 839 do not. The difference in CARs between factory and 
non-factory CEOs stems mostly from former key executives, as the difference in three-day mean 
CARs between key-executive factory CEOs and non-key executive factory CEOs is 1.43% and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
As mentioned before, CEO factories could be good at developing CEO specific human 
capital, or alternatively they could be good at identifying and hiring smart people with an innate 
ability to make good CEOs. To differentiate between these two possibilities, we examine if the 
time spent at a CEO factory is related to the announcement returns. If time spent at the CEO 
factory has no impact on the magnitude of announcement returns, this would favor the selection 
channel that CEO factories are able to attract people with future leadership potential rather than 
helping their employees develop human capital critical for becoming a CEO during their tenure 
at the factory. Hence, we investigate whether CEO’s tenure at the factory firms has any impact 
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on the announcement returns. In Panel D, we partition factory CEOs based on the number of 
years they spent at the factory firms. The sample median length of stay at factory firms is 11 
years. For factory CEOs who spent longer than 11 years in the factory firms, the mean three-day 
CAR is 1.828%. For factory CEOs who spent less than or equal to 11 years in the factory firms, 
the mean three-day CAR is 0.878%. The difference is 0.95% and significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level. This finding suggests that CEO factories are indeed good at promoting 
skills and human capital necessary for becoming a CEO.  
Panel E performs partitions the factory CEO sample based on the number of years the 
CEOs left from factory firms. Most of the CEOs do not immediately jump ship from the factory 
firms to become the CEO of another firm. On average, it takes a mean (median) of 7.5 (5.1) 
years for an employee of a factory firm to become a CEO after he leaves the factory. We 
partition factory CEOs based on the number of years they left from the factory firms and 
compare the CARs. For CEOs who left the factory firms for a shorter period, the mean three-day 
CAR is 1.892%, significantly higher than the 0.806% CAR for CEOs who left for a longer time.  
Overall, these univariate results suggest that factory CEOs are perceived by the market to 
be better CEOs as they are associated with higher announcement returns around the CEO 
appointment. The difference in abnormal returns between factory CEOs and non-factory CEOs 
mainly comes from CEOs hired externally and CEOs who held a key executive position prior to 
becoming the CEO. Furthermore, the longer time the CEO has spent at the factory firm and the 
shorter time it takes for him to become a CEO after leaving the factory firm, the better the 
announcement returns.  
3.1.2. Multivariate Analyses 
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In this section, we check the robustness of our earlier univariate finding in a multivariate 
setting by controlling for a set of firm and CEO characteristics. The dependent variable in these 
regressions is the three-day CAR around the CEO appointment.12 The key independent variable 
is the Factory CEO indicator, which equals one if the CEO had working experience at CEO 
factories prior to becoming the CEO, and zero otherwise.  
Table 5 presents our regression results. In Column (1), we only regress the three-day 
CAR on the Factory CEO indicator, and we find a positive and significant coefficient on the key 
independent variable. In Column (2), we control for firm characteristics such as firm size, 
Tobin’s Q, leverage, ROA, and BHAR prior to CEO appointments. We also include year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects. Again, the coefficient on Factory CEO is positive and 
significant. In Column (3), we further control for CEO characteristics such as whether the CEO 
is an external hire, whether the CEO held key executive positions in his last job, CEO’s gender, 
age, as well as his educational background. The coefficient of CAR on Factory CEO is 0.746% 
and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Firms that appoint factory CEOs experience 
abnormal returns that are 0.75 percentage points higher than those firms that appoint non-factory 
CEOs. Given the sample mean market cap of $6.5B, this translates into a $49 million additional 
increase in value for the shareholders of the firm hiring a factory CEO. 
The coefficients on other control variables are in line with past literature on CEO 
turnovers. We find that abnormal returns are particularly high when poor performing firms 
replace their CEOs, suggesting that investors view turnover announcements as good news to 
correct for previous management errors and improve firm performance. We also show that CARs 
are significantly higher if the incoming CEO is an external hire and if he has held important 
positions in his previous job prior to becoming the CEO.  
                                                 
12 Our results are robust if we use the five-day CAR instead. 
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Factory CEOs may have different valuation impacts, depending on the types of firms they 
join and their own characteristics. In Table 6, we further examine the impact of factory CEOs on 
announcement returns by interacting our key independent variable Factory CEO with the past 
performance of the hiring firm, the external CEO indicator variable, and the key-executive role 
indicator variable at the last job. For firms that had poorer performance prior to CEO turnovers, 
factory CEOs may play a more important role in bringing in his experience and expertise learned 
from factory firms, and therefore, should be associated with higher announcement returns. We 
find consistent evidence in Column (1) as the interaction term of Factory CEO and BHAR is 
negative and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. In Column (2), we interact Factory 
CEO with External CEO, and find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term. 
This is consistent with Table 4 Panel B that factory CEOs have a bigger valuation impact on the 
firm when they are hired externally. We interact Factory CEO with KeyExec at last job in 
Column (3) and continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term, 
consistent the earlier evidence in Table 4 Panel C. This suggests that factory CEOs are 
particularly important when they held key executive positions and had played an important role 
at the previous employer prior to becoming the CEO.  
If CEO factories are good places to nurture CEO human capital, then time spent at a 
factory before becoming a CEO could matter for the value add potential of the factory CEO. 
Their tenure at factory firms and the years they left from factory firms could also impact the 
announcement returns of CEO appointments. Table 7 presents the regression results. In Column 
(1), we interact Factory CEO with the continuous variable # of years at factory firms, and find a 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term. In Column (2), we interact Factory 
CEO with the indicator variable # of years at factory firms>median. Again, we find a positive 
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and significant coefficient on the interaction term, supporting the earlier finding that the longer 
tenure CEOs had at factory firms, the better the announcement returns. Column (3) and (4) 
examine the effect of the number of years between the CEO’s departure from factory firms and 
taking the new CEO positions at our focal firms. The interactions with both the continuous 
measure and the indicator give us consistent results that the investors appreciate the CEOs’ 
factory experiences to a larger extent the shorter the time since CEOs left factory firms. These 
evidences are consistent with Panels D and E of Table 3, and support the view that CEO factories 
are special places in terms of promoting skills and abilities for becoming a successful CEO.  
3.2. Long-run Operating Performance 
If factory CEOs are indeed better performers as perceived by the market and greeted 
through greater announcement returns, , we should also observe better long-run performance in 
firms that appoint  factory CEOs. We use return on assets (ROA) as our measure of operating 
performance, and track each firm for three years after the CEO officially take over the reins. For 
each year, we calculate the industry-adjusted ROA by subtracting the median ROA in their 
industry based on the two-digit SIC codes, and take the average industry-adjusted ROA over the 
three years. The sample mean (median) three-year average industry-adjusted ROA after the CEO 
appointment is 0.036 (0.019). For firms that appoint factory CEOs, their three-year average 
industry-adjusted ROA has a mean of 0.047, significantly higher than the 0.033 for firms that do 
not appoint a factory CEO.  
Table 8 reports the regression results on the long-run ROA. The dependent variable is the 
three-year average industry-adjusted ROA after the CEO appointment, and the key independent 
variable is the Factory CEO indicator. We present the table in a similar pattern to Table 5. In 
Column (1), we only regress the ROA on the Factory CEO indicator. In Column (2), we include 
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firm characteristics as well as year and industry fixed effects. In Column (3), we further control 
for the same set of CEO characteristics such as whether this CEO is an external hire, whether this 
CEO held key executive positions in his last job, gender, age, as well as educational background. 
We find positive and significant coefficients on Factory CEO across all three columns. To 
correct for serial correlation, we include the three-year average industry-adjusted ROA before 
the CEO appointment as an additional control variable in Column (4). The coefficient on Factory 
CEO is 0.009 and significantly different from zero at the 5% level, suggesting that having a 
factory CEO leads to a 0.9 percentage points increase in the post-turnover industry-adjusted 
ROA. This result mirrors our earlier finding that announcement returns are higher in firms that 
appoint factory CEOs, and support the conjecture that factory CEOs are better performers.  
4. Why Do Factory CEOs Perform Better? 
So far we have presented evidence that factory CEOs are better performers as they are 
associated with higher announcement returns around CEO appointments as well as better 
operating performance in the three years following the CEO turnover. In this section, we 
investigate the economic mechanisms that make these factory CEOs different and better 
performers. 
4.1. Corporate Policy Convergence between Focal Firm and Factory Firms 
Superior performance of factory CEOs could be a reflection of the experience and 
knowledge learned at factory firms. Factory firms may be very successful companies, and 
factory CEOs may have accumulated important human capital while they worked at these factory 
firms. If they bring their human capital to the firms that appoint them as CEOs, it could create 
additional values for these firms.  
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We first examine whether factory firms are successful companies themselves. We focus 
on the years that the factory CEOs worked there, and study both their operating performance and 
stock returns. The average industry-adjusted ROA is 0.06, significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. The stocks have also outperformed, as the annual abnormal return is 4.08%, also 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. These performance measures suggest that 
factory firms have outperformed their peers, and the human capital accumulated there could be 
very valuable.  
We next study focal firm’s corporate policies following the CEO appointment. If factory 
CEOs are influenced by their experiences at the factory firm in making corporate decisions at the 
new firm, we expect to observe that corporate policies of the factory CEO’s new firm become 
more similar to those of the CEO’s previous factory. To test this hypothesis, we follow a similar 
methodology as in Bouwman (2011) and estimate the following multivariate regression model: 
ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ାଵ~୲ାଷ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ൫ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕி௔௖௧௢௥௬ െ ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ߛܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߜܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ε௜,௧	
We focus on firm investment policies such as R&D, CAPEX, and acquisitions, as well as 
financial policies such as leverage and dividend payout in the three years following the CEO 
appointment. We obtain firm-year data on R&D expenditures, CAPEX expenditures, and 
acquisition expenditures from Compustat, and scale them by book value of total assets. We 
define leverage as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities over the book value of assets. 
We also calculate dividend yield as the percentage ratio between dividend to common stock and 
market value of equity.  
To measure factory CEOs’ human capital accumulated at factory firms, we try three 
different measures of factory experience. The first measure Policy of factory firm1 refers to the 
equal-weighted annual policy of factory firms during the years the CEO worked at the factory 
20 
 
firm. For example, if a CEO worked at IBM between 1985 and 1990, and became a CEO of a 
smaller company in year 2002, we calculate IBM’s average policy value during the period of 
1985–1990 and use this as a proxy for the CEO’s factory experience. Our second factory 
experience measure Policy of factory firm2 takes into account that some CEOs may have worked 
at more than one factory firms, and we calculate a value-weighted annual policy of factory firms 
during the years the CEO worked there, where the weights are based on factory firm’s total 
assets. Our third factory experience measure Policy of factory firm3 focuses on the most recent 
factory experience of the CEO if the CEO has worked at more than one factory firms, and we 
take an average of annual policy at the most recent factory firm.  
Table 9 presents the regression results. Panel A reports investment policies including 
R&D, CAPEX, and acquisition. Panel B reports financial policies including leverage and 
dividend yield. Because these policy variables have high serial correlation, we include lagged 
policy values of the focal firm in all regressions. In addition, we control for firm characteristics 
in the previous fiscal year such as firm size, firm age, Tobin’s Q, sales growth, leverage, ROA, 
and asset tangibility. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. We find positive 
and significant βs across these policy variables, suggesting that factory CEOs do apply their 
human capital accumulated at factory firms to the new firms they join. Specifically, everything 
else equal, they tend to adopt policies at new firms that are similar to those they implemented or 
witnessed at the factory firms.  
4.2. Alternative Explanations 
An alternative explanation for our finding in Table 9 is that factory CEOs may not bring 
in their human capital and do not have an active influence on the focal firm. Instead, these focal 
firms that hire factory CEOs may be very similar to factory firms, and they display similar 
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corporate strategies no matter whether factory CEOs are appointed or not. To investigate this 
possibility, we follow Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and analyze the precise timing of the observed 
changes in corporate policies. Based on this alternative story, we expect to see some policy 
convergence between focal firm and factory firms prior to the arrival of factory CEOs. If factory 
CEOs do play an active role in transferring human capital from factory firms to focal firms, we 
would observe the changes in policies to happen after the factory CEO is appointed.  
Table 10 presents the regression results on the following multivariate model: 
ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ൫ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕி௔௖௧௢௥௬ െ ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଶ൯ ൅ ߛܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߜܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ε௜,௧ିଵ	
Year t refers to the CEO appointment year. As we notice, the estimated coefficients in 
these placebo regressions are very close to zero, and all but one out of 15 are statistically 
insignificant. These results confirms that policy convergences happen only after the 
appointments of factory CEOs and not prior to their arrivals, consistent with the conjecture that 
factory CEOs bring their accumulated human capital to the focal firms and play an active role 
there.  
Another concern with our finding on corporate policy convergence is that focal firms 
may mimic corporate strategies of any factory firms, not just the factory firm where the factory 
CEO comes from, as factory firms tend to be successful companies and outperform their peers. 
In that case, factory CEOs’ human capital will not matter for the new companies that hire them 
as CEOs. To evaluate this possibility, we randomly assign a factory to a factory CEO. This 
randomly assigned factory firm is in the same Fama-French 12 industry as the actual factory firm, 
but not the one from which the CEO comes from.13 We estimate the following regression model:  
                                                 
13 Since Exxon Corp is the only utility company in our top 30 factory list, we cannot assign a random factory for the 
13 CEOs that came from Exxon Corp. Therefore, our sample size reduces from 484 to 471. In an unreported test, we 
also tried randomly assigning a factory firm without the same FF12 industry requirement, and we observe similar 
results as none of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
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ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ାଵ~୲ାଷ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ൫ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕோ௔௡ௗ௢௠ி௔௖௧௢௥௬ െ ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ߛܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ 
൅ߜܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ε௜,௧	
Table 11 reports the regression coefficients. None of the estimated coefficients in these 
placebo regressions are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that it is not any random 
factory experience that matters. Instead, it is particularly the factory experience that factory 
CEOs accumulated during their years working at factory firms that influences the policies and 
strategies at the new firms.  
To further test of robustness of the influence of factory experiences, we match each 
factory firm with a firm in the same industry with a similar size (and performance), and use the 
matched firm as the benchmark for our focal firms. The idea is policies at factory firms may 
simply reflect industry characteristics rather than imprint from those particular factory firms. Our 
results (unreported) show no convergence of policies of our focal firms towards these 
hypothetical factory firms. 
Finally, given that factory CEOs have the human capital to create greater values for 
shareholders, they should receive higher compensation when assuming the CEO post, after 
controlling for the classic (short-run) determinants of CEO compensation. We find that this is 
indeed the case and present the result in Table 12. On average, a factory CEO earns $34,400 
more in salary and $274,000 more in total compensation than a non-factory CEO with similar 
characteristics.  
5. Conclusions 
 This paper expands the literature on the effect of managers on corporate decisions. We 
find that CEOs who have worked for high-profile firms that are praised for their superior abilities 
in developing managerial talents on average perform better at their new firms. Interestingly, they 
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tend to implement corporate strategies similar to what they have implemented at the factory firm. 
The board of directors should keep in mind CEOs’ tendency in adopting policies that they have 
witnessed success in the past, and select CEOs with the right portfolio of human capital to 
execute new corporate strategies. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions  Data Source
Panel A: measure of appointment returns   
CAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for the firm using the 
market model estimated using the return data of 200 trading 
days ending one month before the CEO appointment date.  
 CRSP
   
Panel B: CEO characteristics   
Factory CEO Indicator variable: 1 for CEOs who has worked at the top thirty 
firms which produce the most number of CEOs, 0 otherwise. 
 BoardEx
External CEO Indicator variable: 1 for CEOs who are hired externally 
(including promoting to CEO position within one year), 0 
otherwise. 
 BoardEx
KeyExec at last job  Indicator variable: 1 for CEOs who held a key executive 
position (CEO/COO/President) at the last job prior to becoming 
the CEO, 0 otherwise.
 BoardEx
Male Indicator variable: 1 for male CEO, 0 otherwise.  ExecuComp
CEO age Age of the CEO when get appointed.  ExecuComp
MBA Indicator variable: 1 for CEOs who hold a MBA degree, 0 
otherwise. 
 BoardEx
Elite school Indicator variable: 1 for CEOs who graduated from Ivy League 
school (plus Stanford/MIT), 0 otherwise.
 BoardEx
   
Panel C: firm characteristics   
Firm size Market value of equity in millions calculated as the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at one month 
prior to the CEO appointment date. Natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity is used in regressions.
 CRSP
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets over book value of assets.  Compustat
Leverage  Book value of debt over book value of assets.  Compustat
ROA Sales minus the cost of goods sold, sales and general 
administration expenses, and working capital change, scaled by 
book value of assets.
 Compustat
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return during the six-month period 
ending one month before the CEO appointment date with CRSP 
value-weighted return as the market index.
 CRSP
    
Panel D: investment and financial policies   
R&D R&D expenditure over book value of assets.  Compustat
CAPEX CAPEX expenditure over book value of assets.  Compustat
AQC Acquisition expenditure over book value of assets.  Compustat
Leverage Book value of debt over book value of assets.  Compustat
Dividend Dividend to common stock over the market value of equity, and 
multiple by 100. 
 Compustat
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Table 1: CEO Factory Firms 
This table presents the top thirty six companies that produce the most number of CEOs.  
 
Company Name Number of 
CEOs 
CEO Factory 
Rank
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 49 1
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES (IBM) CORP 47 2
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 28 3
AT&T CORP  21 4
HEWLETT-PACKARD (HP) CO 21 4
PEPSICO INC 21 4
FORD MOTOR CO 19 7
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC 19 7
MOTOROLA INC 18 9
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC  14 10
GENERAL MOTORS CORP (GM)  13 11
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 13 11
XEROX CORP 13 11
EXXON CORP  13 11
MACY'S INC  12 15
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 11 16
INTEL CORP 11 16
KRAFT FOODS INC 11 16
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC  11 16
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP (UTC) 11 16
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO 10 21
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO  10 21
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 9 23
DOW CHEMICAL CO 9 23
DUPONT(E.I.)DE NEMOURS & CO 9 23
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO 9 23
SPRINT CORP  9 23
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 9 23
ALBERTSONS INC  8 29
CORNING INC 8 29
EASTMAN KODAK CO 8 29
EMERSON ELECTRIC CO 8 29
KROGER CO 8 29
ELI LILLY & CO 8 29
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC  8 29
SARA LEE CORP 8 29
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Table 2: Sample Distribution 
Panel A and B present the distribution of CEO appointments by appointment year and by industry 
classification, respectively. Numbers for the full sample are presented first, followed by subsamples based 
on whether the appointed CEO is a factory CEO or not. Factory CEOs are those who have worked at the 
top thirty firms that produce the most number of CEOs. Non-factory CEOs are those who have not 
worked at the top thirty firms that produced the most number of CEOs. 
 
Panel A: By CEO appointment year 
Year Full Sample Factory CEOs Non-factory CEOs
    Number Percentage Number Percentage
1992 4 0 0.0% 4 100.0%
1993 52 14 26.9% 38 73.1%
1994 66 13 19.7% 53 80.3%
1995 85 12 14.1% 73 85.9%
1996 105 27 25.7% 78 74.3%
1997 117 18 15.4% 99 84.6%
1998 143 25 17.5% 118 82.5%
1999 170 41 24.1% 129 75.9%
2000 205 55 26.8% 150 73.2%
2001 162 35 21.6% 127 78.4%
2002 152 37 24.3% 115 75.7%
2003 162 37 22.8% 125 77.2%
2004 158 35 22.2% 123 77.8%
2005 180 42 23.3% 138 76.7%
2006 160 28 17.5% 132 82.5%
2007 175 31 17.7% 144 82.3%
2008 156 18 11.5% 138 88.5%
2009 93 14 15.1% 79 84.9%
2010 20 2 10.0% 18 90.0%
Total 2,365 484 20.5% 1,881 79.5%
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Table 2: Sample Distribution (continued) 
Panel B: By industry classification 
FF12 Industry Full Sample Factory CEOs Non-factory CEOs
    Number Percentage Number Percentage
Consumer nondurables 145 25 17.2% 120 82.8%
Consumer durables 74 19 25.7% 55 74.3%
Manufacturing 336 79 23.5% 257 76.5%
Energy 78 8 10.3% 70 89.7%
Chemical products 93 29 31.2% 64 68.8%
Business equipment 447 143 32.0% 304 68.0%
Telecom 43 16 37.2% 27 62.8%
Utilities 148 7 4.7% 141 95.3%
Wholesale and retail 313 65 20.8% 248 79.2%
Healthcare 163 39 23.9% 124 76.1%
Finance 277 18 6.5% 259 93.5%
Other 248 36 14.5% 212 85.5%
Total 2,365 484 20.5% 1,881 79.5%
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of 2,365 CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. All variable definitions are in Appendix.  
 
    Full Sample  Factory CEOs Non-factory CEOs Difference
  N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firm Characteristics       
Market cap ($mil) 2,365 6,526 1,477 12,389 2,483 5,018 1,346 7,371 *** 1,137 ***
Tobin's Q 2,365 1.931 1.464 2.117 1.636 1.883 1.439 0.234 *** 0.197 ***
Leverage 2,365 0.226 0.212 0.239 0.218 0.223 0.208 0.016 * 0.010
ROA 2,365 0.030 0.040 0.023 0.038 0.032 0.040 -0.009 -0.002
BHAR 2,365 -0.024 -0.037 -0.039 -0.068 -0.020 -0.033 -0.019 -0.035 *
     
CEO Characteristics      
Factory CEO 2,365 0.205 0.000   
# of years at factory firms 484 13.021 11.008     
# of years left factory firms 484 7.508 5.074     
External CEO 2,365 0.405 0.000 0.543 1.000 0.370 0.000 0.173 *** 1.000 ***
KeyExec at last job 2,365 0.545 1.000 0.510 1.000 0.554 1.000 -0.044 * 0.000 *
Male 2,365 0.972 1.000 0.959 1.000 0.976 1.000 -0.017 * 0.000 **
CEO age 2,365 51.602 52.000 51.556 52.000 51.614 52.000 -0.058 0.000
MBA 2,365 0.355 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.337 0.000 0.089 *** 0.000 ***
Elite school 2,365 0.239 0.000 0.281 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.052 ** 0.000 **
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Table 4: Announcement Returns – Univariate Comparison 
This table presents the univariate analyses of the impact of factory CEOs on announcement returns of CEO appointments. All variable definitions 
are in Appendix. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Factory CEOs vs. Non-factory CEOs 
  
Full Sample  
(N=2,365) 
Factory CEOs  
(N=484)
Non-factory CEOs  
(N=1,881)
Difference
 
  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  
CAR[-1,+1] 0.593 *** 0.208 *** 1.349 *** 0.483 *** 0.398 *** 0.149 * 0.951 *** 0.334 **
CAR[-2,+2] 0.631 *** 0.072 ** 1.420 *** 0.428 *** 0.428 *** -0.058  0.993 *** 0.486 **
 
 
Panel B: External and internal CEOs 
  
External CEO Sample  
(N=959) 
Factory CEOs  
(N=263)
Non-factory CEOs  
(N=696)
Difference
 
  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  
CAR[-1,+1] 1.349 *** 0.665 *** 2.281 *** 1.046 *** 0.997 *** 0.479 *** 1.283 *** 0.567 **
CAR[-2,+2] 1.454 *** 0.520 *** 2.498 *** 1.604 *** 1.059 *** 0.241 ** 1.440 ** 1.362 ***
  
Internal CEO Sample  
(N=1,406) 
Factory CEOs  
(N=221)
Non-factory CEOs  
(N=1,185)
Difference
 
  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  
CAR[-1,+1] 0.077 0.001  0.240 -0.057  0.046 0.004  0.193 -0.061
CAR[-2,+2] 0.069   -0.206  0.138  -0.276  0.057   -0.197  0.081  -0.079  
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Table 4: Announcement Returns – Univariate Comparison (continued) 
Panel C: KeyExec and non-KeyExec at previous firm 
  
KeyExec at Previous Firm 
(N=1,289) 
Factory CEOs  
(N=247)
Non-factory CEOs  
(N=1,042)
Difference
 
  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  
CAR[-1,+1] 0.561 *** 0.152 ** 1.717 *** 0.353 *** 0.286 * 0.088  1.430 *** 0.265 **
CAR[-2,+2] 0.653 *** 0.084 * 1.676 *** 0.517 *** 0.411 ** -0.048  1.265 *** 0.565 **
  
Non-KeyExec at Previous Firm 
(N=1,076) 
Factory CEOs  
(N=237)
Non-factory CEOs  
(N=839)
Difference
 
  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  Mean   Median  Mean  Median  
CAR[-1,+1] 0.631 *** 0.263 *** 0.965 ** 0.614 ** 0.537 *** 0.219 * 0.428 0.395
CAR[-2,+2] 0.604 *** 0.030  1.154 ** 0.340 ** 0.448 * -0.076  0.706  0.416  
 
 
Panel D: Factory CEOs partitioned based on the number of years spent at the CEO factory firms 
  
Years at factory > median  
(N=240)
Years at factory <= median  
(N=244) 
Difference
 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
CAR[-1,+1] 1.828 *** 0.623 *** 0.878 ** 0.348 * 0.950 * 0.275
CAR[-2,+2] 1.990 *** 0.956 *** 0.861 * 0.263  1.129 * 0.693  
 
 
Panel E: Factory CEOs partitioned based on the number of years left from the CEO factory firms 
  
Years left factory <= median 
(N=242)
Years left factory > median  
(N=242) 
Difference
 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
CAR[-1,+1] 1.892 *** 1.069 *** 0.806 ** 0.009  1.086 * 1.059 **
CAR[-2,+2] 1.736 *** 0.691 *** 1.105 ** 0.262  0.631  0.428  
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Table 4: Announcement Returns – Univariate Comparison (continued) 
Panel F: Top5 Factory CEOs, Top6-30 Factory CEOs, and Non-factory CEOs  
  
 (1) Top5 Factory CEOs 
(N=195) 
(2) Top6-30 Factory CEOs 
(N=289) 
(3) Non-factory CEOs 
(N=1,881)  (1) - (2)  (1) - (3)  (2) - (3) 
  Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   
CAR[-1,+1] 1.460 *** 0.284 * 1.274 *** 0.590 *** 0.398 *** 0.149 * 0.186 -0.306   1.062 ** 0.135   0.876 ** 0.441 ** 
CAR[-2,+2] 1.438 *** 0.409 ** 1.409 *** 0.517 *** 0.428 *** -0.058   0.029   -0.108   1.010 * 0.467 * 0.981 ** 0.576 ** 
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Table 5: Factory CEOs and Announcement Returns 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 2,365 CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. 
The dependent variable is CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns from one day before to one day after the 
CEO appointment. Factory CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has worked at any of 
the top thirty firms that produce the most number of CEOs, and zero otherwise. The remaining variable 
definitions are in Appendix. All regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. P-values based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3)
Factory CEO (0,1) 1.045*** 0.956*** 0.758**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.032)
Firm size -0.065 -0.042
(0.477) (0.650)
Tobin's Q -0.039 -0.021
(0.770) (0.873)
Leverage 0.692 0.826
(0.415) (0.328)
ROA -0.941 -0.401
(0.607) (0.826)
BHAR -2.292*** -2.177***
(0.000) (0.000)
External CEO 1.325***
(0.000)
KeyExec at last job 0.700**
(0.021)
Male 0.055
(0.939)
Log(CEO age) -0.633
(0.559)
MBA -0.389
(0.165)
Elite School 0.485
(0.118)
Constant 0.356** 0.487 1.802
(0.014) (0.684) (0.678)
Year Fixed Effect No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes Yes
Observations 2,365 2,365 2,365
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.016 0.023
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Table 6: Factory CEOs and Announcement Returns: Interaction Terms 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 2,365 CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. 
The dependent variable is CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns from one day before to one day after the 
CEO appointment. Factory CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has worked at any of 
the top thirty firms that produce the most number of CEOs, and zero otherwise. The remaining variable 
definitions are in Appendix. All regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. P-values based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3)
Factory CEO (0,1) 0.672* 0.255 0.086
(0.052) (0.591) (0.862)
Factory CEO * Abnormal stock return -3.020**
(0.019)
Factory CEO * External CEO 1.102*
(0.092)
Factory CEO * KeyExec at last job 1.288*
(0.056)
Firm size (log mktcap) -0.050 -0.020 -0.047
(0.590) (0.821) (0.611)
Tobin's Q -0.015 0.002 -0.015
(0.911) (0.988) (0.909)
Leverage 0.791 0.627 0.797
(0.349) (0.418) (0.344)
ROA -0.395 -0.736 -0.286
(0.827) (0.568) (0.875)
BHAR -1.444** -2.277*** -2.171***
(0.021) (0.000) (0.000)
External CEO 1.296*** 1.061*** 1.351***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
KeyExec at last job 0.681** 0.649** 0.444
(0.024) (0.023) (0.170)
Male 0.028 0.144 0.073
(0.969) (0.855) (0.920)
Log(CEO age) -0.633 -1.044 -0.584
(0.559) (0.300) (0.589)
MBA -0.382 -0.408 -0.381
(0.172) (0.146) (0.174)
Elite School 0.491 0.525* 0.480
(0.112) (0.094) (0.121)
Constant 1.782 3.570 1.854
(0.680) (0.373) (0.668)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,365 2,365 2,365
Adjusted R-squared 0.027 0.026 0.025
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Table 7: Factory CEOs and Announcement Returns: Years Worked at/Left from Factory Firms  
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 2,365 CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. 
The dependent variable is CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns from one day before to one day after the 
CEO appointment. Factory CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has worked at any of 
the top thirty firms that produce the most number of CEOs, and zero otherwise. The remaining variable 
definitions are in Appendix. All regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. P-values based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Factory CEOs and Announcement Returns: Years Worked at/Left from Factory Firms 
(continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Factory CEO (0,1) -0.135 0.375 1.398*** 1.345***
(0.796) (0.398) (0.003) (0.005)
Factory CEO (0,1) * # of years at factory firms 0.071**
(0.038)
Factory CEO (0,1) * Indicator (# of years at 
factory firms>median) 0.967*
(0.096)
Factory CEO (0,1) * # of years since leaving  
factory firms -0.081** 
(0.043) 
Factory CEO (0,1) * Indicator (# of years since 
leaving factory firms>median) -1.119*
(0.065)
Firm size (log mktcap) -0.067 -0.064 -0.066 -0.064
(0.482) (0.493) (0.484) (0.495)
Tobin's Q -0.017 -0.037 -0.011 -0.011
(0.898) (0.748) (0.934) (0.933)
Leverage 0.824 0.926 0.851 0.837
(0.330) (0.265) (0.312) (0.322)
ROA -0.347 -0.487 -0.421 -0.443
(0.849) (0.715) (0.817) (0.808)
BHAR -2.153*** -2.284*** -2.159*** -2.162***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
External CEO 1.312*** 1.246*** 1.301*** 1.313***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KeyExec at last job 0.703** 0.662** 0.715** 0.713**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
Male 0.060 0.413 0.131 0.105
(0.935) (0.606) (0.857) (0.885)
Log(CEO age) -0.830 -1.031 -0.436 -0.527
(0.444) (0.313) (0.687) (0.626)
MBA -0.361 -0.455 -0.381 -0.383
(0.199) (0.109) (0.174) (0.172)
Elite School 0.490 0.552* 0.500 0.490
(0.114) (0.083) (0.107) (0.114)
Constant 2.680 3.819 0.987 1.357
(0.538) (0.362) (0.819) (0.754)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.024
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Table 8: Factory CEOs and Long-run ROA 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 2,262 CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. 
The dependent variable is the three-year average industry-adjusted ROA following the CEO appointment. 
Factory CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has worked at any of the top thirty firms 
that produce the most number of CEOs, and zero otherwise. The remaining variable definitions are in 
Appendix. All regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. P-values based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Factory CEO (0,1) 0.015*** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.009**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.042)
Industry-adjusted ROA in the previous 3 years 0.338***
(0.000)
Firm size (log mktcap) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Tobin's Q 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.053***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.280*** 0.275*** 0.037
(0.000) (0.000) (0.300)
BHAR 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
External CEO -0.008** -0.008**
(0.033) (0.016)
KeyExec at last job -0.002 -0.004
(0.557) (0.246)
Male 0.010 0.008
(0.311) (0.339)
Log(CEO age) -0.013 -0.008
(0.379) (0.562)
MBA 0.009** 0.004
(0.026) (0.251)
Elite School -0.013*** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.018)
Constant 0.033*** -0.090*** -0.042 -0.049
(0.000) (0.000) (0.488) (0.375)
Year Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,262 2,262 2,262 2,262
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.279 0.283 0.424
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Table 9: Corporate Policy Convergence 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 484 factory CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. The dependent variables are the 
average corporate policy measures (R&D, CAPEX, AQC, Leverage, Dividend) of the focal firm in the three years after the factory CEO 
appointment. Policy of factory firm1/2/3 is the equal-weighted/value-weighted/most recent factory experience of corporate policy measures (R&D, 
CAPEX, AQC, Leverage, Dividend) during the years that the factory CEO worked at the factory firms. The remaining variable definitions are in 
Appendix. All regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for 
brevity. P-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 9: Corporate Policy Convergence (continued) 
Panel A: Investment policies 
VARIABLES R&D CAPEX AQC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Policy of factory firm1 - Policy of focal 
firm(at t-1) 0.174***   0.062**   0.158*   
(0.010)   (0.042)   (0.085)   
Policy of factory firm2 - Policy of focal 
firm(at t-1)   0.172***     0.058*     0.138*   
  (0.006)     (0.065)     (0.099)   
Policy of factory firm3 - Policy of focal 
firm(at t-1)   0.161**   0.066**   0.139* 
  (0.013)   (0.028)   (0.078) 
Policy of focal firm (at t-1) 0.938*** 0.937*** 0.924*** 0.379*** 0.375*** 0.382*** 0.240** 0.219** 0.221** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) 
Firm size  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
(0.972) (0.910) (0.961) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Firm age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.455) (0.471) (0.459) (0.604) (0.607) (0.560) (0.479) (0.501) (0.481) 
Tobin's Q 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.253) (0.258) (0.270) (0.754) (0.787) (0.765) 
Sales growth 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.186) (0.183) (0.208) (0.267) (0.270) (0.249) (0.679) (0.672) (0.674) 
Leverage -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** 
(0.317) (0.351) (0.301) (0.874) (0.889) (0.888) (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) 
ROA -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.050*** 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.035** 0.035** 0.034** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.155) (0.170) (0.149) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Asset tangibility -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
(0.555) (0.515) (0.525) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.116*** 
(0.787) (0.707) (0.945) (0.395) (0.402) (0.329) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.581 0.580 0.582 0.123 0.121 0.123 
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Table 9: Corporate Policy Convergence (continued) 
Panel B: Financial policies 
VARIABLES Leverage Dividend 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy of factory firm1 - Policy of focal firm (at t-1) 0.090*   0.079** 
(0.064)   (0.015) 
Policy of factory firm2 - Policy of focal firm (at t-1)   0.086*     0.042 
  (0.064)     (0.164) 
Policy of factory firm3 - Policy of focal firm(at t-1)   0.112**   0.090*** 
  (0.019)   (0.005) 
Policy of focal firm (at t-1)     0.389*** 0.356*** 0.400*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 
(0.153) (0.174) (0.170) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* 0.178* 0.175* 0.180** 
(0.087) (0.073) (0.084) (0.052) (0.059) (0.049) 
Tobin's Q 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.009 
(0.304) (0.280) (0.255) (0.898) (0.976) (0.832) 
Sales growth 0.017 0.016 0.016 -0.199 -0.182 -0.215 
(0.671) (0.678) (0.687) (0.299) (0.342) (0.265) 
Leverage 0.826*** 0.818*** 0.839*** 0.071 0.091 0.067 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.839) (0.795) (0.849) 
ROA 0.028 0.029 0.024 1.733*** 1.721*** 1.726*** 
(0.732) (0.718) (0.771) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset tangibility -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.698* 0.702* 0.626 
(0.966) (0.995) (0.976) (0.085) (0.083) (0.124) 
Constant 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.118*** -0.951** -0.918** -0.968** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.025) (0.031) (0.022) 
      
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.604 0.605 0.607 0.419 0.414 0.422 
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Table 10: Corporate Policy Convergence Prior to CEO Appointment 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 484 factory CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. The dependent variables are the 
average corporate policy measures (R&D, CAPEX, AQC, Leverage, Dividend) of the focal firm in the year prior to the factory CEO appointment. 
Policy of factory firm1/2/3 is the equal-weighted/value-weighted/most recent factory experience of corporate policy measures (R&D, CAPEX, AQC, 
Leverage, Dividend) during the years that the factory CEO worked at the factory firms. The remaining variable definitions are in Appendix. All 
regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. P-
values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand 
for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 10: Corporate Policy Convergence Prior to CEO Appointment (continued) 
Panel A: Investment policies 
VARIABLES R&D CAPEX AQC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Policy of factory firm1 - Policy of focal firm (at t-2) 0.084   -0.003   -0.120   
(0.105)   (0.929)   (0.360)   
Policy of factory firm2 - Policy of focal firm (at t-2)   0.079     -0.005     -0.045   
  (0.128)     (0.894)     (0.727)   
Policy of factory firm3 - Policy of focal firm (at t-2)   0.093*   -0.003   -0.038 
  (0.075)   (0.923)   (0.724) 
Policy of focal firm (at t-2) 0.992*** 0.988*** 0.997*** 0.654*** 0.653*** 0.654*** -0.071 0.003 0.010 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.596) (0.984) (0.932) 
Firm size  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.718) (0.757) (0.663) (0.419) (0.423) (0.422) (0.679) (0.694) (0.698) 
Firm age -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.488) (0.489) (0.488) (0.362) (0.358) (0.352) 
Tobin's Q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.250) (0.253) (0.246) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.872) (0.895) (0.891) 
Sales growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.991) (0.969) (0.982) (0.410) (0.410) (0.410) (0.428) (0.422) (0.428) 
Leverage 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
(0.219) (0.215) (0.207) (0.568) (0.571) (0.569) (0.528) (0.517) (0.523) 
ROA 0.046** 0.046** 0.046** -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.413) (0.416) (0.414) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Asset tangibility -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** -0.037** -0.036** -0.036** 
(0.265) (0.240) (0.261) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Constant 0.014* 0.014 0.015* 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.011 0.012 
(0.095) (0.103) (0.086) (0.349) (0.352) (0.340) (0.469) (0.591) (0.559) 
            
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.881 0.880 0.881 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.025 0.023 0.023 
 
  
44 
 
Table 10: Corporate Policy Convergence Prior to CEO Appointment (continued) 
Panel B: Financial policies 
VARIABLES Leverage Dividend 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy of factory firm1 - Policy of focal firm (at t-2) 0.056   -0.015 
(0.142)   (0.587) 
Policy of factory firm2 - Policy of focal firm (at t-2)   0.060     -0.002 
  (0.127)     (0.938) 
Policy of factory firm3 - Policy of focal firm (at t-2)   0.046   -0.004 
  (0.193)   (0.909) 
Policy of focal firm (at t-2)     0.856*** 0.866*** 0.865*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.021 0.019 0.019 
(0.879) (0.945) (0.868) (0.580) (0.600) (0.598) 
Firm age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.130* 0.132* 0.131* 
(0.374) (0.385) (0.380) (0.059) (0.056) (0.058) 
Tobin's Q 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
(0.163) (0.155) (0.170) (0.235) (0.245) (0.243) 
Sales growth -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.728) (0.709) (0.714) (0.967) (0.924) (0.932) 
Leverage 0.979*** 0.980*** 0.966*** 0.372 0.368 0.369 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.361) (0.367) (0.366) 
ROA -0.088 -0.087 -0.088 0.091 0.103 0.100 
(0.223) (0.232) (0.223) (0.757) (0.727) (0.738) 
Asset tangibility 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.274 0.272 0.276 
(0.751) (0.705) (0.761) (0.534) (0.535) (0.526) 
Constant -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.106*** 0.116 0.102 0.103 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.855) (0.873) (0.872) 
      
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.787 0.617 0.617 0.617 
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Table 11: Corporate Policy Convergence: Random Factory Firms 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 484 factory CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. The dependent variables are the 
average corporate policy measures (R&D, CAPEX, AQC, Leverage, Dividend) of the focal firm in the year prior to the factory CEO appointment. 
Policy of random factory firm1/2/3 is the equal-weighted/value-weighted/most recent factory experience of corporate policy measures (R&D, 
CAPEX, AQC, Leverage, Dividend) during the years that the factory CEO worked at the randomly selected factory firms. The remaining variable 
definitions are in Appendix. All regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French industry fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed for brevity. P-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 11: Corporate Policy Convergence: Randomly Assigned Factory Firms 
Panel A: Investment policies 
VARIABLES R&D CAPEX AQC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Policy of random factory firm1 - Policy of 
focal firm (at t-1) 0.050   -0.014   0.147   
   (0.255)   (0.639)   (0.182)   
Policy of random factory firm2 - Policy of 
focal firm (at t-1) 0.065     -0.011     0.092   
   (0.144)     (0.727)     (0.387)   
Policy of random factory firm3 - Policy of 
focal firm(at t-1) 0.063   -0.001   0.094 
   (0.140)   (0.980)   (0.334) 
Policy of focal firm (at t-1) 0.849*** 0.862*** 0.860*** 0.295*** 0.299*** 0.308*** 0.218* 0.164 0.165 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.164) (0.123) 
Firm size  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.866) (0.880) (0.901) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Firm age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.436) (0.430) (0.423) (0.820) (0.829) (0.828) (0.166) (0.155) (0.169) 
Tobin's Q 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.143) (0.146) (0.154) (0.918) (0.943) (0.928) 
Sales growth 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.202) (0.181) (0.182) (0.477) (0.479) (0.462) (0.996) (0.977) (0.988) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.017* -0.016* -0.017* 
  (0.157) (0.161) (0.140) (0.688) (0.697) (0.717) (0.069) (0.083) (0.077) 
ROA -0.046** -0.046** -0.046** 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.178) (0.171) (0.162) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset tangibility -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** -0.029** -0.029** -0.029** 
  (0.412) (0.401) (0.400) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
Constant 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 
  (0.792) (0.814) (0.752) (0.143) (0.152) (0.167) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.746 0.746 0.746 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.119 0.116 0.116 
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Table 11: Corporate Policy Convergence: Randomly Assigned Factory Firms (continued) 
Panel B: Financial policies 
VARIABLES Leverage Dividend 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy of random factory firm1 - Policy of focal firm (at t-1) -0.004   -0.042* 
   (0.920)   (0.095) 
Policy of random factory firm2 - Policy of focal firm (at t-1)   -0.006     -0.043 
     (0.873)     (0.109) 
Policy of random factory firm3 - Policy of focal firm(at t-1)   -0.007   -0.055* 
     (0.844)   (0.070) 
Policy of focal firm (at t-1)     0.259*** 0.258*** 0.248*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Firm size  0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 
  (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age -0.014* -0.014* -0.014* 0.189** 0.188** 0.196** 
  (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.044) (0.045) (0.040) 
Tobin's Q 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 
  (0.485) (0.491) (0.496) (0.753) (0.761) (0.771) 
Sales growth 0.017 0.018 0.018 -0.188 -0.187 -0.189 
  (0.685) (0.683) (0.682) (0.319) (0.321) (0.314) 
Leverage 0.741*** 0.739*** 0.738*** 0.063 0.068 0.044 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.858) (0.847) (0.900) 
ROA 0.031 0.031 0.031 1.705*** 1.719*** 1.722*** 
  (0.704) (0.702) (0.703) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset tangibility 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.857* 0.847* 0.883** 
  (0.821) (0.820) (0.821) (0.051) (0.052) (0.042) 
Constant 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.145*** -0.872** -0.823* -0.813* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.044) (0.060) (0.061) 
        
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.405 0.404 0.404 
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Table 12: Factory CEOs and CEO Compensation 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of 2,365 CEO appointments between 1992 and 2010. The dependent variable in column (1) – 
(3) is the natural log of base salary, and the dependent variable in column (4) – (6) is the natural log of total compensation. Factory CEO is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has worked at any of the top thirty firms that produce the most number of CEOs, and zero otherwise. 
The remaining variable definitions are in Appendix. All regressions control for calendar-year fixed effects and 12 Fama-French industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. P-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm 
clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 12: Factory CEOs and CEO Compensation (continued) 
  Log (Salary) Log (TDC)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Factory CEO (0,1) 0.183*** 0.070*** 0.057** 0.442*** 0.135*** 0.096**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Firm size 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.398*** 0.401***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin's Q -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.009 -0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.572) (0.709)
Leverage 0.102* 0.106* 0.415*** 0.439***
(0.080) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.013 0.044 -0.307* -0.205
(0.876) (0.612) (0.078) (0.233)
BHAR -0.077** -0.067* -0.092 -0.068
(0.034) (0.066) (0.119) (0.249)
External CEO 0.072*** 0.203***
(0.001) (0.000)
KeyExec at last job 0.062*** 0.089***
(0.004) (0.007)
Male -0.079** 0.021
(0.031) (0.800)
Log(CEO age) 0.214** -0.013
(0.020) (0.923)
MBA -0.001 0.053*
(0.972) (0.097)
Elite School 0.013 0.036
(0.556) (0.342)
Constant 6.336*** 5.154*** 4.328*** 7.818*** 4.525*** 4.372***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365
Adjusted R-squared 0.018 0.367 0.373 0.032 0.463 0.471
 
